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1 The EM/ETIC Conundrum
In his paper on 'Social security reforms in China:
towards an East Asian model?', Gordon White
(1998:174) asks the apparently simple question:
'To what extent can emergent patterns of social pro-
vision (in China) be described as distinctively
Chinese?'
The tension implicit in this question turns on a
problem for any social scientist trained to think in
terms of general theories of society who becomes
deeply immersed in the study - and fluent in the
language - of one particular country At its core is
the search for what is universal about the society
under study and what is unique about it; in anthro-
pology, this dilemma has classically been reduced
to a distinction between an ernie (inside) and an
etic (outside) analysis of any particular society
As Gordon White and I discuss in our introduction
to The East Asian Welfare State, the distinction
between emic and etic perspectives is crucial for
understanding how welfare regimes are con-
structed, perceived and legitimated. One of the
themes of the book is that notions of both a general
East Asian Welfare Model and more nationally
bounded models such as the so-called 'Japanese-
style welfare society' (Nihongata shakai fukushi
shahai) are the constructions of elites within East
Asian and Japanese society, drawing on discourses
of 'tradition' and cultural determinism to justify
low welfare expenditures and the maintenance of
the expectation that individual welfare needs
should be met primarily by the company, commu-
nity or family, but not, if it can be avoided, the
state. If there is anything distinctive about the role
of the state in East Asian welfare regimes, we con-
cluded, it is that it is expected to play the role more
as a regulator than a provider of welfare.
When I review my own position in the discussions
that Gordon White, Huck-ju Kwon and I had while
putting together The East Asian Welfare Model, I
now realise that I instinctively took the position
that the state should not limit itself to a regulatory
role in welfare provision and that the level of 'social
inclusiveness' or 'citizenship' (to use the current
jargon) in a society could be measured in terms of
the extent to which the state itself actually supplied
the welfare. To a degree, I think Gordon agreed
with this position. Certainly a passage in our joint
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Table 1: Foundation dates of current Yôgoshisetsu (1998)
Foundation periods: 19th century: 26 (5%); Meiji (1868-1912) 56 (10.7%); Taisho (1912-26) 22 (4.2%); pre-war 23%;
1945-55 57.1%; since 1980 13 (2,5%)
Derived from Zenkoku Yôgoshisetsu Kyôgikai (ed.), 1998
introduction which I remember him inserting
would suggest this was his viewpoint (1998:18):'
What does 'welfare' mean in different societies?
For example, the options available to a person
with disabilities in Britain or the United States,
where a substantial network of state support
exists, may be greater than in a welfare system
where the only or main provider is the family
and the state plays a residual role. The latter
welfare systems may be cheaper, but are they
producing less 'welfare', in terms of both qual-
ity and quantity?
In general, though, I realise that Gordon was more
open-minded than I about the potential for non-
I remember that Gordon based this passage on
thinking through how he himself would be treated
differently in the UK and Chinese welfare systems. This
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state agencies in welfare provision, as long as the
state, on behalf of its citizens, took a proper regula-
tory role: for him what mattered was the quality of
care, not how it was provided. In the course of
undertaking research on the child welfare system in
Japan over the past twelve months, I realise that I
have become increasingly influenced by this posi-
tion. Indeed, I think (at the risk of inviting criti-
cisms to which all reflexive anthropologists lay
themselves open - staring at their navels on the
Road to Damascus!), I can even begin to trace that
influence in my writing on Japanese welfare over
the past few years. This article is an exploration,
therefore, of how assumptions about methods of
welfare provision can affect the conclusions to be
drawn from studying the welfare system of another
was just a few days after he had appeared in a TV
documentary discussing the changing position of those
with physical handicap in Chinese society
N = 520
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society, and how immersion in a welfare system ol
another country can lead to different conclusions
about the best methods of welfare provision; or how
an etic view of welfare systems needs to be balanced
by an emic one.
2 Children's Homes in Japan
The particular institutions on which I wish to con-
centrate in this article are jidô yôgoshisetsu (called
simply yôgoshisetsu in Japanese and 'childrenh
homes' in English) which are the longest-established
welfare facilities in the society and hence, since his-
torical depth is so important in Japanese society,
those with the highest status. Of the current 540
yôgoshisetsu, over 10 per cent can date their found-
ing to the Meiji period (1868-1912) and a further
15 per cent to the pre-war period; very few have
been founded in the past twenty years (see Table 1).2
Throughout the post-war period, the yôgoshisetsu
have catered for around 30,000 children (the figure
has changed little until recent years) whose parents
cannot look after them. Some of the reasons behind
their coming into care represent a social history of
post-war Japan: war orphans in the late-1940s; the
children of poor labourers in the 1950s and 1960s
forced to move around the country looking for work
(dehasegi); the offspring of those who borrowed too
much in the 1970s and became indebted to loan
sharks (sarakin); the result of growing rates of drug
and alcohol abuse in the 1980s; the victims of the
recession in the 1990s as increasingly large numbers
of individuals declared themselves bankrupt (jiko has-
san) and placed their children in the care of the state.
Significantly, though, it has always been maintained
that children come into care not through any fault of
their own, but because of their parents' problems.
Through the post-war period, yôgoshisetsu them-
selves have changed remarkably little and have
There is an interestingly constructed official history of
child welfare institutions as a whole in Japan which
seeks to trace their origins back to Prince Shôtoku Taishi
in the sixth centuty and even to the activities of various
emperors a couple of centuries earlier before written
records were available (Tsuji 1934; Tatara 1975; Nomoto
1998). These histories', which appear for example in all
official accounts of child welfare institutions in Japan,
have played an important role in securing continuing
imperial patronage for child welfare institutions and
demonstrating' their long 'roots' though their historical
accuracy is extremely dubious (see Hastings 1995).
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retained a number of distinctive features which
make them very different from similar institutions
in North Europe3 or North America.
Except for a brief period immediately after the
war, yôgoshiselsu have consistently cared for
over 90 per cent of the children who come into
care of the state. Systems of fostering and adop-
tion for such children, which have become the
norm in many other capitalist societies, are still
very undeveloped and indeed have been in
decline, to the point of almost disappearing in
some areas in recent years (see Tables 2 and 3).
Yôgoshisetsu tend to be large, congregate-types
of institutions. Even today the average capacity
of a home is over 60 and many homes have
capacities of over 100, though only the best
homes are full to capacity
In the immediate post-war period, around 20
per cent of homes were state-run and indeed
these homes were often better funded than pri-
vate homes. In the past 30 years, however, the
majority of state homes have been shut down
and today over 90 per cent of homes are pri-
vately owned and run, though state funded. Of
the 90 per cent, around 70 per cent are run by
family concerns, which pass the running of the
institution down from one generation to the
next, ideally through patrilineal primogeniture,
though, as always in the Japanese inheritance
system, this rule will be by-passed if a better
candidate is available. This system is known as
the dôzoku hein (same-family management) sys-
tem and has had important implications for the
development of the whole welfare system in
post-war Japan. Since yôgoshisetsu have the
longest history of welfare institutions in Japan,
those families which have run yôgoshisetsu have
often been allowed to establish other welfare
There are major differences in the child welfare
systems between North and South Europe (see Aarre
1998; Madge 1994). Indeed, in many ways, the system
in Southern European societies such as Spain, Porrugal,
Italy and Greece, which also rely mainly on residential
over foster care, resembles the Japanese system; Esping-
Andersen (1990) points out the structural similarities
between South Europe and Japanese welfare systems in
his magisterial, if flawed, work, The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism.
Table 2: Figures for Futsû (normal), Tohubetsu (special) and Kokusai (international) Yôshi
adoptions of children 1985-1996
Notes: The tokubetsu yôshi system only came into effect in 1988.
Sources: Iwasaki (1992: 56); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996: 54); Kikuchi, 1998, 81
institutions, such as old people's homes; today
most yogoshisetsu are part of, often the flagship
institution in, large welfare corporations (shahai
fuhushi hôjin) which may have as many as
twenty welfare institutions, many of which will
be run by members of the same family
Staffing levels in Japanese yôgoshisetsu have
remained virtually unchanged since 1976, at six
children over the age of six per member of staff.
Since staff work eight-hour shifts this means, on
average, around 14-16 children at any one time
under the care of each member of staff. Staff in
homes tend to be non-unionised, young and
often short-term, except for those who are
members of home-owning families who tend to
remain in the institutions throughout their
working lives.
These families, over the years, have generally
built up long-term relationships with the local
community in which they operate, which are
often crucial for the running of the homes. One
means through which homes have been able to
provide some level of extra care has been
through the use of local volunteers; in the case
of one yôgoshisetsu with less than 70 children
where I undertook research, it was estimated
that around 500 members of the local commu-
nity gave up at least one day a year in the form
of volunteer activity at the home.
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3 Analysing Japanese Child
Welfare: Towards an Etic Critique
My early attempts at analysing yôgoshisetsu
(Goodman 1993, 1996) were generally very nega-
tive of the way in which they were run and were
highly influenced, I now realise, by the 'welfarists'
in Japan who believe (a) that the state should be
responsible for welfare provision and (b) that the
agents of the state in Japan are generally primarily
interested in saving money and social control
rather than providing quality control. I was critical
of the child welfare system in general and of
yôgoshisetsu in particular on a number of points:
the over-reliance of institutionalisation; the lack of
concern about normalisation; the virtual absence of
professionalisation; the dearth of investment; and
the non-existence of debates about children's
rights. The system was run more in the interests of
the homes themselves and the bureaucrats who
placed children in those homes, than it was for the
children who came into the care of the state. All
placements were made by untrained (in social
work terms) local government officers (jidô-
fukushishi) who were transferred often to short-
term positions in the local government child
guidance centres (jidôsôdanjo) where they took
advice from locally appointed, high-status, often
elderly (average age over 60) volunteers (jidôiín-
minseiiin) in the community, and placed children in
decrepit and almost Dickensian welfare institutions
YEAR Futsû Yöshi
* = under 20
** = under 18
Tokubetsu
Yôshi
all under 6
Total of
Futsü and
Tokubetsu
adoptions
Kokusai
(international)
adoptions
1985
1986
1987
3245*
3296*
2876*
3245
3296
2876
1988 242 1* 1814 4235
1989 2151* 1933 4084
1990 2037* 1178 3213
1991 1529** 619 2148 381
1992 13 10* * 509 1819 359
1993 1258* * 520 1778 337
1994 1205* * 491 1696 339
1995 1111** 521 1632 299
1996 971** 426 1397
Table 3: Number of registered foster families, families fostering children and children in
foster Care (1949-95)
Sources: Nihon Sôgô Aiku Kenkyûjo (cd.), 1988: 236; Kôseitôkeikyôkai (ed.), 1992: 116; RH, 1998: 113
from which often they could not leave until they
were sixteen or even eighteen and then were forced
to make their own way in the outside world,
unprepared and unsupported. Small wonder,
therefore, that many of those who came into care
were the children of parents who had themselves
been in care and even less wonder that no one was
prepared to find out exactly how many such chil-
dren there were in care and what happened to oth-
ers as they left the care system.4
Although my view of the child welfare system in
Japan was extremely negative, I was far from alone
in holding to it. After 40 years of virtual silence
about the whole system in Japanese society, the
1990s saw a sudden explosion of debate. The dri-
ving force behind this was the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child which was signed by Japan
in September 1990, ratified by the government in
May 1994 and reviewed by the UN Committee for
the Rights of the Child in July 1998. While the
Japanese government argued that ratifying the con-
There has been virtually no work undertaken on what
happens to care leavers, an even bigger gap in Japan
than it would be in many other societies, where
meticulous statistics are generally kept on all issues to
do with those who come into contact with the state.
The intensity of the argument was exacerbated by the
fact that Japanese is not a UN language and hence
much of the meaning of the convention was open to
interpretation. Even in translating the title of the
Convention, the government insisted on using the
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vention necessitated only minor changes to
Japanese practice and law (the Child Welfare Law
was revised for the first time for 40 years in 1998),
critics within Japan argued that it meant radically
overhauling the whole child welfare system.5 Chief
among these critics was the national association of
lawyers in Japan (Nichibenren) which argued very
much along the lines I had myself taken in my
works and submitted a counter-report to that of the
government to the UN committee in the summer of
1998 (Nichibenren 1997).
The UN committee in its final report dabbed faint
praise on those reforms the Japanese government
had made and largely followed and repeated the
criticisms of the Nichibenren report; indeed, it cas-
tigated the government representatives for working
in opposition instead of together with Nichibenren,
when it was clear that the latter only had the best
interests of children (the key to the convention) at
heart, implying that the interests of the government
representatives perhaps lay elsewhere. Even more
bureaucratic term for child, 'jidô', while organisations
like Nichibenren (see below) used the more child-
focused term, kodomo'.
I was indeed in contact with some members of this
organisation from early in my research and I have little
doubt that I was influenced by their approach, which
tended to be implicitly comparative between best
practice in certain Western societies (particularly the
UK and Scandinavia) and what they took as worst
practice in Japan (see Nichibenren, 1993, 1995).
Registered foster
families
(A)
Active
foster families
(B)
Children in
foster
placements
% of Registered
families
fostering
(B)/(A)
1949 4153 2909 3278 70.1
1953 13288 7271 8041 54.7
1955 16827 8370 9169 49.7
1960 19022 7751 8737 40.7
1965 18230 6090 6909 33.4
1970 13621 4075 4729 34.5
1975 10230 3225 3851 31.5
1980 8933 2646 3188 29.6
1985 8658 2627 3322 30.3
1991 8163 2183 2671 26.7
1993 8090 2083 2561 25.7
1995 8059 1940 2377 24.1
Table 4: Aggregate social welfare expenditures in some OECD countriesa (% GDP, 1993)
Notes: a. Consolidated, general government expenditures, current plus capital accounts, b. 1992 (except education: 1993). r.
1994. d. This figure significantly overstates national data, e. Includes benefits plus active labour market policies, f. Includes
disability occupational illness and injury and sickness
Source: Jacobs 1998:47
interesting, however, was the response to the gov-
ernment line that there was no widespread desire
among the Japanese public to see the child welfare
system changed: the UN committee retorted that it
was the duty of the government to educate and lead
rather than to follow public opinion.
As one stands back from these often rather heated
debates, however, it is clear that the position of the
UN, Nichibenren and indeed my own position are
based on a number of common assumptions which
need to be made more explicit:
As we have just seen, the idea that main concern
of government welfare bureaucrats is to save money
(and have an easy life) rather than the welfare of
children in the care of the state.
Those who have professional qualifications will
necessarily provide higher quality care.
Fostering and/or adoption are better ways to care
for children than in large institutions.
The experience of children who are in institu-
tions should be made as similar as possible to that
of children in 'normal' families (Bowiby's classic
notion of 'normalisation').
Children who come into the care of the state
through no fault of their own are entitled (as 'citi-
76
zens' of a society) to a decent standard of life and
should not be dependent on the arbitrary nature of
charitable giving and voluntary help.
As mentioned earlier, the state should lead rather
than be pushed into the development of better wel-
fare provision.
The Japanese child welfare system measured up
very poorly against these criteria; hence it deserved
to be criticised.
4 Towards an Emic Understanding
While the account that the above assumptions gen-
erate is logically consistent and coherent and also,
judging from the reaction of the UN Committee for
the Rights of the Child, compelling, it is problematic
for an anthropologist in that it is hypothesis-led
rather than empirically deprived. Even more seri-
ously, for an anthropologist, it cannot account for all
the ethnographic evidence which is available; not all
yôgoshisetsu today can be understood within the
above model, since they are far from homogeneous
in the way they operate. It is necessary, therefore, to
take these assumptions above in turn and see how
they can be modified in the light of the evidence
from the particular context of contemporary Japan.
(1)There is no doubt that politicians and bureaucrats
in Japan are under heavy pressure to control welfare
Japan" France Germany Sweden United
Kingdom
United
States
Education 3.70 5.60 4.70' 6.70 5.20 5.20
Health care 5.27 728 6.43 6.22 5.75 5.85
Old age, surv.
pensions
5.70 1169 11.24 10.30 715d 6.19
Unemployment' 0.36 3.33 4.34 5.84 1.78 0.79
Family benefits 0.20 2.12 1.37 2.78 1.81 0.35
Other social security' 0.57 2.05 3.03 4.44 2.34 1.60
Personal soc. 0.42
services
1.11 1.01 6.39 1.05 0.35
Housing benefits 0.92 0.24 1.17 1.84
Others 0.12 0.22 0.59 0.91 1.7 0.55
Total 16.14 34.33 32.97 44.73 28.62 20.84
Figure 1: Approximate relative proportions of children and young people in residential and
foster care in 16 European countries, 1992
residential care foster care
90%
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany, East
Germany West
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
England
Wales
Scotland
Source: Adapted from Madge, 1994
expenditure. As Table 4 suggests, welfare expendi-
ture in Japan may still be low in comparison with
North European societies, but this will be increas-
ingly hard to contain as Japan's population continues
to age faster than that of any other large-scale society;
by 2015, one in four Japanese will be over the age of
64; by 2050, one in three (Nikkei Weekly, 27 January
1997). While Japan's personal tax burden (see Ka
1999:120) is also low in comparison with North
European and North American competitors, raising
taxes has always been highly problematic in post-war
Japan;7 as Japan struggles to climb out of its 1990s
recession, raising taxes has become a virtually taboo
subject. Tokyo and Osaka in particular are currently
running enormous budget deficits and are commit-
ted to major welfare expenditure on the elderly
through their participation in the Gold Plan of 1990
and the New Gold Plan of 1994.
As well as supporting a growing elderly population,
there have also been demands on local government
for a variety of child welfare measures under the so-
called Angel Plan of 1995, which aims to support
childrearing and stem the rapidly declining fertility
The taboo about raising taxes in Japan currently is
largely related to a lack of confidence in how the
government spends public taxes; there is no public
budget system in Japan and hence people have little
sense of knowing what happens to their tax payments.
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90%
rate in Japan (currently around 1.38 against a replace-
ment rate of 2.1). The Angel Plan calls for a massive
increase over the next ten years of extended day-care
centres and after-school clubs, so that women can
combine careers with bringing up families.
All this suggests, therefore, that even if welfare offi-
cials in Japan are interested in providing better care
for children in care, the political agenda has forced
them to focus on better provision for the elderly
and working mothers; on those who have votes and
who are productive members of society, rather than
those who are too young to vote and are unproduc-
tive. As the economy actually contracts, their room
for manoeuvre is increasingly limited.
(2)The debate about professionalisation is a long
one, though perhaps in the case of social workers
best known through Ivan Illich's book on Disabling
Professions (1977). If Illich pushes the argument to
extreme lengths - that social workers and other car-
ing professions ultimately serve their own interests
rather than those of their clients - more moderate
versions can be found in Ezra Voge1 Japan as
Number One (1980). The workers in the child guid-
ance centres may not be qualified, but they are
drawn from the top educational echelons in Japan;6
similarly, few workers in residential institutions
have formal social work credentials, but almost all
of them have been through university As elsewhere
in Japanese recruitment practices, there is a prefer-
ence for generalists over specialists and for training
to be on-the-job as much as possible. As some writ-
ers on the social work system in Japan have sug-
gested (see, for example, Matsubara, 1996), it may
be the overall level of educational background,
rather than the specific qualifications in social
work, which ultimately affect the quality of care
provided to children in homes.
(3) There are a number of different aspects of the
debate about fostering versus institutional care that
need examination. First, as Figure 1 shows, even
within Western Europe, there is a clear distinction
between north European countries which favour
fostering and south European societies which sup-
port still high rates of institutionalisation. This divi-
sion maps, of course, quite neatly onto
Esping-Andersen-type distinctions between
Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon, Continental Europe
and Scandinavian welfare regimes in terms of state
mechanisms of welfare provision. While it goes
unrecognised in the UN or Nichibenren reports,
Japan is not as out-of-line in its reliance on institu-
tional care as most critics have suggested. Perhaps
more significant, though, is the concern in many
north European societies that an ideological com-
mitment to fostering over institutional care has not
always been in the best interests of some children,
as placements have continually broken down and
children have needed to be moved from home to
home (see Berridge and Cleaver 1987). The average
stay in yôgoshisetsu, which at almost five years has
been criticised as being too long, might be argued to
offer a level of continuity and stability for some chil-
dren not available in other forms; certainly this idea
is gradually being accepted in the UK in recent
years, as more child welfare institutions are being
opened for certain categories of children in care
(Berridge and Brodie 1998).
In recent years, large number of social work courses
and universities have opened up in Japan in recognition
of the need for more social welfare workers to deal with
the ageing society As Ito (1995) points out, however,
these tend not to be at the top level universities and
hence their graduates seldom pass the competitive
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Such child welfare institutions in the UK, how-
ever, are established on the basis of being as small
and as invisible as possible. Ideally, no-one should
know they are there and ideally children should
pass through them and back into society without
being stigmatised by the experience.
Yôgoshisetsu in general, as we have seen, take a very
different line: the homes are clearly marked, the
children drive around in buses with its name
emblazoned on the side and wear sweat shirts with
it on their chests. They are told that they should not
be ashamed to be members of the home - it is not
their fault that they are in care - and not to do any-
thing that will bring shame on its name. Indeed, the
home should provide them with a sense of group
identity - without which no one can operate in
Japan - and a point of reference in an otherwise
uncertain future. Homes build up long-term rela-
tions with their local communities: they develop a
relationship with the teachers in the local schools
who understand the particular needs of children
who often come from very troubled backgrounds;
they build up relationships with local employers
who in the past often took children on as appren-
tices and provided them lodging when they left
school and the home. Moreover, since the families
who run the homes are committed to them for life,
its senior members will still be there for former res-
idents to talk to when they return in later life and
indeed many do just that: the heads of homes regu-
larly act in loco parentis at the weddings of former
residents and quite a few former residents come and
work in homes as staff later in life, sometimes
alongside the children of the founding family with
whom they grew up.
If the idea of children's rights has not been fully
incorporated into Japanese society, then it may be
that there is a different sense of both the child and
of rights in the society In the UK, debates about
children's rights and children in care have led to a
determination that such children should be 'given
space' and that their voices should be listened to as
they are helped to reintegrate into mainstream soci-
ety; in Japan, the emphasis is on teaching children
exams to become local or central government
bureaucrats, Ironically, therefore, few of those who are
qualified in social work can get jobs in local
government social work offices; and few of those who
work in such offices are qualified.
how to work together in groups and to fit into hier-
archies so that they are prepared for the realities of
life after institutional care. Sadly, in the UK at least,
there has been a vicious backlash against the free-
dom given to children in care as newspapers run
stories about 'delinquents' being taken on safaris
and summer holidays as a 'reward' for their bad
behaviour; in Japan, where there has been debate
on such issues, it has normally been accepted that
children in care need discipline as much as love,
perhaps more so since they will be very much on
their own when they go into the outside world. As
is often pointed our, children are Japanh only nat-
ural resource and hence it is the duty of the state to
prepare them ro be useful members of society as
much as to educate them in their own rights.
(6) Perhaps most importantly though yôgoshisetsu
can and do evolve; indeed, in the 1990s, homes
have changed more than in any of the previous five
decades for a number of interconnecting reasons:
debates about the UN convention and growing
public awareness of the idea of children's rights; the
dramatic decline in the fertility rate and the possi-
bility that within a few years far fewer yôgoshisetsu
will be needed; the 'discovery' of child abuse in
Japanese society and the awareness that many of the
children in care are not simply in need of protection
but also help.9
As a result of these pressures, there have been a num-
ber of interesting developments during the 1990s
among yôgoshisetsu. In particular, there has been a
bifurcation between progressive homes, which have
tried to set up innovative programmes (including for
the first time therapeutic care for abused children
and various services to support children in their own
homes and to look for foster placements for those
The idea that child ahuse is possible is a very recent
one in Japan and the figures for abused children remain
very low. Official statistics on abused children only
began to be collected in 1991 (1101 cases) but
immediately began to show the type of exponential
growth (5353 cases in 1997) which characterised the
'discovery' of child abuse in the US in the 1970s and
the UK in the 1990s. lido gyakutai (child abuse),
though, still remains associated essentially with physical
abuse, normally related to over-zealous disciplining;
there is little recognition of the idea that adults might
indulge in abusive behaviour for sadistic pleasure, or
that they might abuse children sexually, both of which
have become the common understandings of child
abuse in most Western societies.
79
who come into long-term care), and conservative
homes, which continue to argue that the style of
large, congregate-type of care that relies to a large
degree on peer socialisation that is provided in
yôgoshisetsu is appropriate in a Japanese context and
does not need changing. As the 1990s come to an
end, it is becoming increasingly clear that only the
progressive homes are likely to survive long into the
next millennium, since only those homes considered
the 'best' by the jidôsodanjo will be sent children.'°
While the changes that have taken place may be
particular to the 1990s, the way in which they have
occurred are consistent with virtually all changes in
social welfare institutions in Japan over the past 50
years; they have been led by private institutions
needing to be entrepreneurial in order to ensure
their survival, in many cases so that the institution
can be passed on to the next generation of the same
family as a viable operation. There is no doubt that
those who run the yôgoshisetsu have vested interests
in maintaining them as going concerns. There is no
doubt also that this may not always be in the best
interests of the children in care, since unregulated
market forces can lead to some unfortunate results:
children being kept in care for longer periods, chil-
dren who do not need to be in care being taken into
care, new programmes being set up to take new cat-
egories of children into care without there being the
proper support systems or staffing for them once
they are there. There is evidence for all of these dur-
ing the 1990s (see Goodman 1993, 1996; Tsuzaki
1993, 1997). Where such abuses are regulated,
however, there is evidence that when the child wel-
fare market is as competitive as it is in Japan in the
late 1990s, then this can lead to change as institu-
tions are forced to become increasingly entrepre-
neurïal in their bid to survive.
° While the number of children in homes has declined
(if only slightly) throughout the 1990s, very few private
homes have actually been forced to close, in part
because the budget they have received from central and
prefectural governments has been based on their
capacities and not the actual number of children in
their care. The change in this policy as of 1 April 1999
is likely to have a dramatic effect on the poorer (in both
senses) homes.
5 Clearing Up the Em/Etic Mess
Which brings me back to where we started. How
should we understand welfare systems? Do we
develop universal criteria about the 'correct' role for
the state in welfare provision and measure societies
against those criteria; or do we examine each soci-
ety purely in its own historical and cultural context
and thereby render comparative analysis very diffi-
cult indeed? The UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child (and some progressive yôgoshisetsu)
clearly feels the former; the Japanese government
(and some conservative yôgoshisetsu) the latter.
Perhaps our first task as academics, who have
access to both the ernie and etic versions of social
welfare development, is simply to present these to
allow others to see the range of possibilities that lie
along the regulatory-provider continuum and the
outcomes that these different models produce.
In doing so, as we argue in The East Asian Welfare
Model, it is possible to begin to separate images and
discourses about welfare from the actual manage-
ment and provision of welfare. When the
economies of East Asian societies were booming,
idealised versions of East Asian welfare discourses
were drawn upon by western politicians in order to
legitimate their own welfare reforms; as East Asian
economies collapse, the fall-out or downside of
such systems become only too obvious. For the first
References
Aarre, Karen, 1998, 'The child welfare debate in
Portugal: a case study of a children home', in lain
R. Edgar and Andrew Russell (eds), The
Anthropology of Welfare, London: Routledge: 57-72.
Berridge, David and Isabelle Brodie, 1998, Children's
Homes Revisited, London: Jessica Kingsley
Publishers.
Berridge, D. and H. Cleaver, 1987, Foster Home
Breakdown, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Boyden, Jo, 1990, 'Childhood and the policy makers:
a comparative perspective on the globalization of
childhood', in Allison James and Alan Prout (eds),
Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood:
Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of
Childhood, London, New York and Philadelphia:
The Falmer Press:183-215.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 1990, The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press.
80
time in 50 years, one can see in Japan queues of
unemployed day-labourers lining up at open-air
soup kitchens and sleeping in charity-provided
tents; in the Airin area of Osaka alone, the number
of such homeless in early 1999 hit almost 10,000.
Perhaps most importantly, however, academics
should be in a position to draw on ernie discourses
to confront the most extreme elle ones, and vice
versa. Should we accept Boyden's (1990) argument
that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
is the last vestige of Western colonialism, any more
than the UN own line that there is a universal way
to protect the best interests of all children? As
Gordon, Huck-ju and I discovered in the course of
our discussions, the answer was always, 'yes, but
East Asian welfare systems are both similar
(from an eric perspective) and yet very different
(from an ernie one) from each other; they have both
developed along their own lines and have been sus-
ceptible to the same sorts of political and economic
pressures as any other welfare system. Ultimately,
though, as Gordon White reminded us, it is the
quality of welfare provided that matters and not how
it is produced; and if, as academics, we are able to
show both how a variety of welfare systems have
ideologically developed and how they work in real-
ity, and thereby allow policy-makers to examine
their own systems in the light of this full knowledge,
then we may have done something worthwhile.
Goodman, Roger, 1993, 'Children homes and chu-
dren rights in contemporary Japan', Research
Papers in East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield:
School of East Asian Studies, No 1: 3 1-65.
Goodman, Roger, 1996, 'On introducing the UN
Convention of the Rights of the Child into Japan',
in Roger Goodman and Ian Neary (eds), Case
Studies on Human Rights in Japan, Kent: Japan
Library (Curzon Press): 109-40.
Goodman, Roger, Gordon White and Huck-ju Kwon
(eds), 1998, The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare
Orientalism and the State, London and New York:
Routledge.
Hastings, Sally Ann, 1995, Neighbourhood and Nation
in Tokyo, 1905-1937, Pittsburgh and London:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Illich, Ivan, 1977, Disabling Professions, London;
Salem, N.H.: Marion Boyars.
Ito Yoshiko, 1995, 'Social work development in Japan',
Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 29, No.
5:258-68.
Iwasaki Mieko, 1992, 'Zadankai' ('General discus-
sion'), Atarashii Kazoku ('New family'), No. 21,
Yôshi to Satooya o Kagaeru Kai.
Jacobs, Didier, 1998, 'Social welfare systems in East
Asia: a comparative analysis including private wel-
fare', CASE Paper 10, London: Centre for Analysis of
Social Exclusion, London School of Economics.
Ka, Lin, 1999, Confucian Welfare Cluster: A Cultural
Interpretation of Social Welfare, Acta Universitatis
Temperensis 645.
Kikuchi Midori, 1998, 'Tokubetsu Yôshi Seido to
Koseki' ('Koseki and the special adoption system'),
in Sakakibara Fujiko (ed), Koseki Seido to
Kodomotachi ('The Koseki system and children'),
Tokyo: Akashi Shoten: 79-116.
Kôseitôkeikyôkai (ed), 1992, Kokumin no Fukushi no
Dôkô ('Trends in public welfare'), Vol. 39, No. 12.
Madge, Nicola, 1994, Children and Residential Care in
Europe, London: European Children's Centre and
National Children's Bureau.
Matsubara, Yasuo, 1996, 'Social Work in Japan:
Responding to Demographic Dilemmas', in M. C.
Hokenstad, S.K. Khinduka, and James Midgley
(eds), Profiles in International Social Work,
Washington DC.: National Association of Social
Workers Press: 85-97.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1996, The Pirst
Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Tokyo: Gaimusho (Japanese language version).
Nichibenren (Japan Federation of Bar Associations)
(cd.), 1993, Kodomo no Kenri Jôyaku to Kazoku,
Fukushi, Kyôiku, Shonenhô ('Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the Family, Welfare,
Education and the juvenile Justice System'), Tokyo:
Kouchi Shobo.
Nichibenren (cd.), 1995, Kodomo no Kenri Manual
('The Children Rights Manual'), Tokyo:
Nichibenren.
Nichibenren Uapan Federation of Bar Associations),
1997, 'Report on the implementation in Japan of the
81
Convention on the Rights of the Child', mimeo,
June.
Nihon Sôgô Aiiku Kenkyüjo (cd.), 1988, Nihon
Kodomo Shiryô Nenkan ('Annual Statistical Review of
Children in Japan'), 1988/89, Nagoya: Chûô
Shuppan.
Nomoto Sankichi, 1998, Shakai FukushiJigyô no Rekishi
('The history of social welfare work'), Tokyo: Akashi
Shoten.
Tatara Toshio, 1975, 1400 Years of japanese Social Work
from its Origins through the Allied Occupation,
552-1952, Ph.D. thesis, Bryn Mawr College.
Tsuji Zennosuke, 1934, Social Welfare Work by the
Imperial Household of Japan, trans. by Masao
Nagasawa, Tokyo: The Japanese Red Cross Society
Tsuzaki Tetsuo, 1993, 'Eikoku no "Kodomo no Koe"
Undo to Waga Kuni ni okeru Genjô' ('The children's
voice movement in England and the situation in our
country') in Kodomo no Koe (cd.), Jidô Fukushi
Shisetsu ni okeru lidO no Kenri Hoshô no Jittai ni
konsum Chôsa Kenkyü ('Survey report on the situa-
tion of the protection of children's rights in child
welfare Institutions'), Tokyo: 102-25.
Tsuzaki Tetsuo, 1997, 'Socio-cultural causes of institu-
tional abuse in Japan: the issues of leadership,
authority and power relation', Early Child
Development and Care, Vol. 133: 87-99,
Vogel, Ezra F., 1980, Japan as Number One: Lessons for
America, Tokyo: Tuttle.
White, Gordon and Roger Goodman, 1998, 'Welfare
Orientalism and the search for an East Asian welfare
model', in Roger Goodman, Gordon White and
Huck-ju Kwon (eds.), The East Asian Welfare Model:
Welfare Orientalism and the State, London and New
York: Routledge: 3-24.
White, Gordon, 1998, 'Social security reforms in
China: towards an East Asian model?', in Roger
Goodman, Gordon White and Huck-ju Kwon
(eds.), The East Asian Welfare Model, 175-97.
Zenkoku Yôgoshisetsu Kyôgikai (cd.), 1998, Zenkoku
JidO Yôgoshisetsu Ichi ran, Heisei 1996-7 ('Register of
all Yogoshisetsu, 1996-97'), March.
